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of disagreement with the unanimous account of all other
witnesses in the vicinity who testified was his claim that the
deceased fired first. [18] Of course, it was for the jury
to determine his credibility as against that of said witnesses
who agreed that only one shot was fired. (People v. Smith,
15 Ca1.2d 640, 648 [104 P.2d 510].) There was substantial
evidence in support of the jury's determination and its finding will not be disturbed. (People v. Smith, snpra, p. 648;
People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 685 [185 P.2d 1].)
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, ,J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
15, 1953.

[L. A. No. 22369.

In Bank.

Dec. 19, 1952.]

GEORGE T. FRANCK et al., Respondents, v. THE J. J.
SUGARMAN-RUDOLPH COMPANY (a Partnership)
et al., Defendants; J. J. SUGARMAN et al., Appellants.
[1] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Uniform Sales Act.-The
Uniform Sales Act does not apply to sales of corporate
stock. (Civ. Code, § 1796.)
[2] Sales- Warranties- Waiver- Acceptance and RetentLon of
Goods.-Purpose of Civ. Code, § 1769, stating that in absence
of agreement the acceptance of goods does not discharge
seller for breach of promise or warranty, but requiring notice
by buyer of claimed breach in reasonable time to preserve
his rights, was to ameliorate harshness of common law rule
in some states that mere acceptance by or passage of title
to buyer of goods constituted a waiver of any and all remedies for breach of warranty, and at the same time to give
seller some protection against stale claims by requiring notice.
[1] Uniform Sales Act as applicable to sale of corporate stock,
note, 99 A.L.R. 275. See, also, Am.Jur., Sales, § 3.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sales, § 60.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Corporations, § 305; [2] Sales,
§ 141; [3, 4] Corporations, § 307; [6, 7] Corporations, § 322.
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[3] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Warranties-Waiver.General rules on sales of goods, in effect prior to adoption
of Uniform Sales Act, apply to sales of corporate stock, including rule that an acceptance of goods by the buyer, knowing of breach of warranty, constituted a waiver by him of
a claim for damages for the breach, at least unless he gave
notice of his complaint within a reasonable time.
[ 4] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Warranties-Waiver.-Conclusion
of trial court that buyer waived alleged breach of written
contract of sale of all stock of corporation by failing to inform sellers of alleged deficiency in assets of corporation
until at least three years after completion of audit of corporation's books, notwithstanding repeated requests for such
information, was correct although the court did not specifically
mention Civ. Code,§ 1769, requiring notice by buyer of claimed
breach within a reasonable time to preserve his rights, and
although that section may not be technically controlling,
where the parties agreed that the buyer's auditors should
make their report within a reasonable time, and where the
rule followed by the court, whether based on the law of sales
of personal property apart from the Uniform Sales Act or
on that statute itself, is substantially the same.
[5] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Cross-demands-Waiver.-Merely
because the amount of payment for all stock of corporation was by agreement of the parties to be reduced by offsets arising out of a deficiency of assets of the corporation,
does not necessarily mean that a notice of the asserted deficiency should not be given in a reasonable time after discovery, and the right to have an offset for such defieiency
is waived by failure to give notice of the deficiency within
a reasonable time.
[6] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Actions-Limitations.-An action
based on contracts for sale of all stock of corporation is
not barred by the statute of limitations, whether it be assumed that the two-year period applies, as for money had
and received (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, sub d. 1), or the fouryear period, as an action for breach of contract (Code Civ.
Proc., § 337, subd. 1), where the action was commenced less
than a year after the federal government, to which a portion of the purchase price had been paid to discharge a tax
lien against the corporation, refunded the taxes, and where
the balance of the purchase price was not to be paid to
plaintiffs until the refund was obtained and hence the action
did not accrue at least until then.
[7] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Actions-Parties.-An action based
on contracts for sale of all stock of corporation may be
maintained by sellers notwithstanding the fact that a tax refund by the federal government, to which a portion of the
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purchase price had been paid to discharge a tax lien against
the corporation, was received by the corporation, which was
removed as a party to the action, rather than defendant
buyer, where, regardless of whether the action was for money
had and receiveq or on the contracts, the tax refund received
by the corporation was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs
under agreements providing that if the refund was received
by the corporation, defendant would cause the corporation
to assign it to plaintiffs.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for money had and received.
ttffs affirmed.

Judgment for plain-

Knight, Gitelson, Ashton & Habenbaugh, Alfred Gitelson
and Leon Savitch for Appellants.
John W. Preston and John W. Preston, Jr., for Respondents.

CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs commenced an action for money
had and received in the sum of over $65,000. Defendants,
a partnership hereafter referred to as defendant, and the
partners, answered raising general issues and also counterclaimed and asserted affirmative defenses for over $98,000,
and raised the defense of the statute of limitations (Code Civ.
Proc., §§339[1], 337[1], 338[4], 343).
'fhe judgment from which defendant appeals awarded
plaintiffs $64,054.61, with interest, and that defendant take
uothing by the counterclaim. The court excluded evidence
on the affirmative defenses and counterclaim on the ground
that defendant had waived them.
According to the findings, on August 7, 1943, plaintiffs entered into a written agreement with defendant, agreeing to
sell all of the issued shares (3,267) of Hercules Foundries,
Inc., a eorporation, (hereafter called Hercules) for $110,000.
The contract provided that plaintiffs "represent and guarantee'' that the financial condition and property of Hercules
was (as of July 31, 1943) as set forth in the contract, and
in reliance on that "guarantee" defendant promised to buy
the stoek and to pay for it as follows: $10,000 on execution
of the contract, $90,000 on delivery of the stock and the
balance of $10,000 when they received (paragraph 2 [c]) "a
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certificate signed jointly by" plaintiffs' auditor and defendant's auditor "verifying the truth of the representations"
and guarantees above mentioned.
Plaintiffs delivered to defendant the stock and all the assets
and records of Hercules on August 16, 1943. On August
18, 1943, the United States Collector of Internal Revenue
filed a lien for taxes against Hercules for $103,112.67. To
meet that situation and pay the taxes under protest the
parties entered into a new contract on August 21, 1943,
modifying the first one to the effect that from the money payable by defendant to plaintiffs for the stock there would be
paid under protest sufficient to discharge the tax lien; and
that defendant would cause Hercules to prosecute a claim
for refund of the $103,112.67 for the use of plaintiffs. Mention vvas again made of the guarantee and audit and it was
provided that if the tax refund is received, defendant will
cause Hercules to assign to plaintiffs all right to the refund
subject to such existing offsets, if any, arising out of the
''guarantee.'' Pursuant to the agreements, escrows were provided and other supplemental agreements were made which
are discussed later herein.
ln accordance with the last contract the tax lien was paid
and a refund claim made, resulting in refunds in August
and December, 1948, amounting to $82.54-6.45.
In compliance with paragraph 2(c) of the first contract
(above rnentioned) shortly after the delivery of the stock, etc.,
defendant had its auditors make an audit of Hercules' books.
'l'he auditors submitted to defendant a preliminary report in
the latter part of September, 1943, and a final report in September, 1944, and at all times thereafter defendant had actual
knowledge of all matters pertaining to the property, assets
and financial condition of Hercules as of July 31, August 7
and August 21, 1943. 'l'he audit showed according to defendant's counterclaim and affirmative defenses, that the value
of Hercules' assets was $98,448.74, less than represented by
the guarantee and balance sheet in the first agreement. Plaintiffs had no such knowledge and did not know that defendant
elaimed or asserted the assets were less than represented in
the first agreement or that a violation of that contract had
occurred until they were notified by and received from defendant a copy of the audit on July 31, 1947. Defendant accepted the stocks, assets and records of Hercules and at all
times has retained exclusive possession thereof. Finding
that an unreasonable time elapsed between the audit and
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notification to plaintiffs, the court concluded defendant had
waived the purported breach of promise as to the assets of
Hercules upon which its affirmative defenses and counterclaim are based and the claim of breach was barred by laches
and section 1769 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the court concluded that defendant held for and
was indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of $64,054.61, which
was the amount of the tax refund recovered less expense of
recovery.
In addition to defendant's having obtained and retained
at all times after August 16, 1943, and after they knew the
claimed breach of the "guarantee," all the stock and assets
of Hercules, it appears from the record that after the contracts were made, correspondence passed between Mr. Gazlay,
a representative who was handling the matter for plaintiffs, and Mr. Katz, the representative of defendant. On
September 13, 1943, Gazlay wrote to Katz stating that defendant's auditors had said the audit was practically completed; that it should be completed as soon as possible and
that plaintiffs should receive a statement from defendant as
to whether it claimed the assets and financial condition of
Hercules was not as represented in the contract; that the
time to settle the matter was "now when the facts are
fresh and records available.'' Katz replied on September
14, 1943, agreeing with the thoughts expressed by Gazlay
and stating that he had asked the auditors for a report and
would advise Gazlay as soon as he had it. On September
30, 1943, Gazlay wrote to Katz calling his attention to the
previous correspondence and again requesting the report.
On October 4, 1943, Katz sent to Gazlay a copy of a letter
from defendant's auditors which was in response to a letter
from Katz to the auditors. The auditors stated they expected
to have a final report ready on October 11, 1943, a draft of
which had been made. On October 11, 1943, Gazlay wrote
to Katz. He referred to the copy of the auditors' letter
and stated that under the contract the report should be
finished in a reasonable time and such time had elapsed
and the matter should be settled now while the facts were
fresh in the parties' minds. Receiving no reply from Katz,
Gazlay wrote to Katz on November 2, 1943, demanding the
report and stating that the failure to furnish it was a breach
of the contracts. Again receiving no reply Gazlay wrote
on January 6, 1944. He referred to the former correspondence
and of Katz' refusal to speak to him on the telephone and
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stated: ''. . . it would appear that I am entitled to at least
professional courtesy. If your clients do not desire to give
the statement, you could at least have written an evasive
letter, at which I am advised you excell. I resent the treatment received from you. I again request a copy of the
statement hereinbefore referred to.'' In a letter from Katz
to the auditors on September 14, 1943, Katz stated he agreed
with Gazlay that then was the time to determine whether
the balance sheet in the contracts was correct. Gazlay died
in 1944 and several of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest
died. As before seen from the findings, defendant had a preliminary report in the latter part of September, 1943, and
the final in September, 1944, but did not give a copy to
plaintiffs or advise that they made any claim of a breach
of the "guarantee" until July 31, 1947.
As seen from the findings it was the theory of the trial
court that defendant lost its claim for damages for the
alleged breach of the guarantee because of the unreasonable
length of time elapsing after their discovery of the claimed
deficiency of Hercules' assets (at least three years) and by
reason of the conduct of defendants during that time. As
we construe the findings they may be based on either laches,
waiver, or a failure to comply with section 1769 of the
Civil Code.*
Defendant's main contention is that it did not lose its
rights under any of those theories; that section 1769 cannot
apply because it is a part of the Uniform Sales Act as
adopted in this state and does not include sales of stocks
in a corporation; that, as the action is legal in nature the
equitable doctrine of laches cannot apply; that there was no
assent to the alleged breach of the guarantee; and that there
could be no bar by laches, waiver or otherwise because the
contracts contemplated and the law is that any claimed deficiency in the assets would be offset against the purchase
price; that in effect the purchase price was not to be paid
until the correctness of the ''guarantee'' and the amount
of recovery for refund of taxes had been ascertained.
*Civil Code, § 1769: "In the absence of expTess or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not
discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy
for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the
sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within
a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.''
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Section 1796 of our Civil Code reads the same as,
and is a part of, the Uniform Sales Act, adopted in this
state. The act, with the exception of the statute of frauds
provision ( Civ. Code, § 1724), refers to the sales of goods
and that term is defined to ''include all chattels personal
other than things in action and money. The term includes
industrial growing crops, and things attached
to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be
severed before sale or under the contract of sale.'' ( Civ.
§ 1796.) And, by reason thereof, it has been held
inapplicable to the sale of corporate shares. (Porter v. Gibson, 25 Cal.2d 506 [154 P.2d 703]; Eckart v. Brown, 34 Cal.
App.2d 182 [93 P.2d 212]; Williston on Sales (rev.ed.),
§ 619 [a].) It was also stated in the Porter case that the
court would not apply the sales act to sales of stock by analogy
and for sake of uniformity as was done in Agar v. Orda,
264 N.Y. 248 [190 N.E. 479]. It may be noted that this
state has also adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
Code, §§ 2450 et seq.) but no provision thereof has
been indicated as supplying a solution to the instant case.
That being the case it is of no assistance in determining what
rule should be applied here. The court went on in the Portt>r case, however, and applied the law of sales of personal
property (other than as stated in the sales act), particularly
as enunciated in Cttthal v. Peabody, 19 Cal.App. 304 [125 P.
926], which, in dealing with sales of stock, relied upon the
provisions of the Civil Code and rules of law in cases dealing with the sales of personal property as they existed before the Uniform Sales Act was adopted.
The first sentence of section 1769 of the Civil Code,
supra, states that in the absence of agreement the acceptance
of the goods does not discharge the seller for breach of promise
or warranty, but the second sentence requires notice by the
buyer of a claimed breach in a reasonable time to preserve
his rights. 'l'he purpose of the two sentences was to "ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule in some states that
the mere acceptance by or passage of title to the buyer of the
goods constituted a waiver of any and all remedies for breach
of warranty, and at the same time to give the seller some protection against stale claims by requiring notice. (See discussion, Williston on Contracts [rev.ed.], § 714.)" (Whitfield
v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1].) [3] Apparently
the rule was, before the uniform act, as to the sale of personal
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property generally that an acceptance of the goods by the
buyer, knowing of the breach of warranty, constituted a
waiver by him of a claim for damages for the breach, at least
unless he gave notice of his complaint within a reasonable
time. (See Strefl v. Gold 111edal Creamery Co., 96 Cal.App. 18
[273 P. 831]; Glaclium Co., Inc. v. Thatcher, 95 Cal.App. 85
[272 P. 340]; Stockton Lb1·. Co. v. Mulcahy, 86 Cal.App. 505
[260 P. 897] ; Ame1·ican Steel Pipe etc. Co. v. Hubbard, 42
Cal.App. 520 [183 P. 8:30] ; Burrell v. Southern Calif. C. Co.,
;;5 Cal.App. 162 [169 P. 405] ; Doak Gas Engine Co. v. Fraser,
168 Cal. 624 [143 P. 1024]; Byron Jackson JJiachine Works
v. Dufl, 158 Cal. 47 [109 P. 616]; Pigott v. Clar·k, 133 Cal.
App. 53 [23 P.2d 800] ; 22 Cal.Jur. 983-988.) The same rule
is stated in the Restatement. (Rest., Contracts, § 412.) And
it has been held either tacitly or directly that the general
rules on sales of goods applied to sales of corporate stock.
(See Cuthill v. Peabody, s~r,pm, 19 Cal.App. 304; Kirkland v.
Levin, 63 Cal.App. 589 [219 P. 455] ; Po?'ter v. Gibson, supra,
25 Cal.2d 506.)
[4] There appears to be no valid reason why the rule
applicable to the question here involved and stated in the sales
act and probably the law before the sales act, should not
apply to sales of stock in a corporation, especially when it is
remembered that the sale included all of the stock, and in
effect, all of the records and assets, tangible and intangible,
of the corporation. Although defendant did not know of the
financial condition of Hercules when the stock was transferred,
it found out later and for over three years made no claim of
the breach of the guarantee, and in the meantime some of the
parties concerned with the transaction died. From the correspondence between Gazley and Katz, the latter, as above seen,
agreed that defendant's auditors should make their report
within a reasonable time and it should be ascertained whether
there was any claim of a breach of the guarantee by plaintiffs
while the facts were fresh in the minds of the parties. The
reason, to protect the seller from stale claims (Whitfield v.
J essnp, sttpra, 31 Cal.2d 826) is present. Hence, we conclude that the trial court was correct in its conclusion,
althou§rh it did specifically mention section 1769 of the Civil
Code as one of the grounds for its ruling, and that section
may not be technically controlling. It is true that there are
indications in the record that the court was basing its conclusion on section 1769, but as we have seen, the findings are
broad enough to include waiver, and it makes no difference
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whether that was based upon the law of sales of personal
property apart from the sales act or the sales act itself, as
the rule is substantially the same.
Defendant argues, however, that even assuming section
1769 to be applicable, there are other supplemental agreements as well as the ag-reements of August 7 and 21, 1943,
which show that any deficiency in the assets as compared with
the "guarantee" waR to be ascertained when the tax refund
was obtained (it was received in 1948, one year after defendant g·ave notice to plaintiffs of the claimed breach of
"guarantee") and then any offsets by reason of the deficiency
were to be made against the refund. Escrow instructions
were entered into pursuant to the August 7th contract whereby $90,000 was to be deposited with a bank by defendant
and paid out by the bank when it received a certificate signed
by the auditors of the parties as prescribed by paragraph 2 (c)
of the August 7th contract, and if the certificate shows a
deficiency in the assets the latter should be deducted and the
balance paid to plaintiffs. On August 19, 1943, after the tax
lien was filed the parties in an agreement referred to the tax
lien and the $90,000 which was deposited with the bank and
provided that that sum plus $15,000 (including the $10,000
down payment) be deposited with the federal court ·wherein
the tax refund action was pending and the balance (after a
certain deduction) shall be applied to pay defendant the
amount of any deficiency under the guarantee as determined
by the auditors of the parties. Then followed the contract
of August 21, 1943, heretofore mentioned, in which it was
provided that the balance of the purchase price (after mentioning the method for payment of a small portion of it)
shall be payable out of the tax refund when received, subject as above mentioned to the offsets, if any, by reason of any
deficiency in the assets which shall be deducted from the
refund.
Implicit in the court's finding that an unreasonable time
had elapsed after defendant discovered the asserted deficiency, is the conclusion that the audit and claim of deficiency
must be made in a reasonable time after the contracts were
made, and the correspondenee heretofore discussed shows that
Katz, defendant's representative, so construed the agreements.
It also shows that the parties considered that the audit should
(at least initially) be made by defendant's auditors, which, of
course, is reasonable because the audit was primarily for defendant's benefit, inasmuch as it was the party who would be
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benefited if there was a deficiency in the assets. Defendant
had the possession and control of the records and assets of
Hercules. Plaintiffs had no real opportunity to have their
auditors make an audit as Katz kept stalling on the report
of defendant's auditors, never even mentioning an audit
by plaintiffs' auditors. While the agreements speak of
payment in terms of offsets, the trial court was justified in
finding impliedly at least (it found waiver and that an unreasonable time had elapsed) that defendant should give a
reasonable time notice of any claimed deficiency disclosed by
the audit after it discovered the same. [5] Merely because
the amount of payment for the stock was to be reduced by offsets arising out of a deficiency, does not necessarily mean that
a notice of the asserted deficiency should not be given in a
reasonable time after discovery, that is, that the rule of law
above held applicable to this case does not apply.
In this same connection defendant cites Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Cal.2d 627 [170 P.2d 893], where we held that
under certain circumstances cross-demands between parties
under section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be
deemed compensated and thus paid to the extent they equal
each other and hence the statute of limitation does not run on
the paid portion. That has no application iu the instant case
where the rule of law declared is applied, because here the
right to have damages or offset for the alleged breach of the
''guarantee'' is waived for failure to give notice of the claim
of breach within a reasonable time. Hence it necessarily
follows that the right to have the cross-demands compensate
each other is lost.
By reason of the result reached herein it is unnecessary
to consider the contentions with reference to laches.
[6] Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to
make a finding on its plea of the statute of limitation. However, it is a mere matter of law and mathematical computation, for whether we assume the two-year period applies, as
for money had and received (Code Civ. Proc., § 339[1] ), or
the four-year period, as for an action for breach of contract
(Code Civ. Proc., § 337[1] ), it is admitted that on August
24 and December 21, 1948, the federal government refunded
the taxes. The action was commenced on June 8, 1949, less
than one year thereafter and the balance of the purchase
price was not to be paid to plaintiffs until the refund was
obtained and hence the action did not accrue at least until
then.
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[7] Finally, it is asserted by defendants that a recovery
could not be had for money had and received because the tax
refund was received by Hercules, which was removed as a
party to the action, rather than defendant. Without going into
the question of whether the action was for money had and received or on the contracts, it is clear that the tax refund received by Hercules was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs
under the agreements which provided that if the refund was
received by Hercules, defendant would cause Hercules to assign it to plaintiffs since all the stock and assets of Hercules
had been delivered to defendant at that time pursuant to the
agreements.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, .J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18702.
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GREGORY S. STOUT et al., Petitioners, v. DEMOCRATIC
COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE et al., Respondents; FITZGERALD AMES et al., Real Parties in Interest.
[1] Mandamus-Title to Office.-Generally, title to public office
cannot be tried in a mandamus proceeding for the reason
that quo warranto is an adequate remedy.
[2] !d.-Existence of Office.-It is proper in mandamus to determine whether the office claimed by a person legally exists.
[3] !d.-Title to Office.-Title to office may be incidentally determined in mandamus, and discretion rests with the court
to determine whether the title should be so determined.
[4] Quo Warranto-Trying Title to Office.-Generally, quo warranto is appropriate only where there is involved a public
office in the sense that the incumbent exercises some of the
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 22; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 225.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 5; Am.Jur., Quo Warranto,
§ 22.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6] Mandamus, § 18; [ 4, 5] Quo
Warranto, § 5; [7] Elections, § 34.

